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Abstract: Disengagement from militant groups has often been related to individual level 
explanations like battle fatigue or desire to re-join family and friends. We seek to 
empirically examine which other factors, beyond individual level determinants, influenced 
disengagement processes among militants belonging to different types of Chechen militant 
organizations. Drawing empirical insights from unique in-depth interviews with former 
members of Chechen insurgency, their relatives, eyewitnesses of Chechen wars, and 
experts with first-hand knowledge of the researched phenomena, this study examines 
disengagement among jihadist and nationalist Chechen militants. Focusing on group-level 
factors, such as capacity to resist external pressures, use of violence, in-group social bonds 
and group cohesion, this article demonstrates that disengagement was a less viable course 








This article seeks to examine pathways towards group-level disengagement1 from 
militant organizations among two types of militants in Russia’s republic of Chechnya: 
nationalists and jihadists. Existing research on militant disengagement has mostly focused 
on individual-level characteristics as determinants of disengagement (Altier et al. 2014). 
Scholars demonstrated that members of militant groups can be more or less receptive to 
push and pull factors. They may be pushed from their respective groups by disillusionment 
with ideology, disapproval of military tactics and mistrust in their comrades (Oppenheim 
et al. 2015; McLauchlin 2015), or pulled from the outside by external pressure, 
demobilization incentives and a desire to return to family and friends (Bearman 1991; 
Horgan 2009; Walter 1999). In this article, we extend our analysis beyond individual-level 
determinants in that we empirically examine what role does the type of militant 
organization play in the process of disengagement for its members, focusing on Chechen 
nationalist and Islamist2 militants. In contrast to research on individual-level factors, we 
explore whether such group-level determinants as external pressure, use of violence, social 
bonds and group cohesion affected individual choices to leave armed groups during the 
                                                 
1  Due to the absence of an all-encompassing definition of group-level disengagement that 
could be applied to broader categories of militants beyond ‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’, this 
study endorses the conceptualization of disengagement as a generic term. In this vein, 
disengagement is presented here as the process through which members of militant organizations 
abandon their groups. This definition does not exclude the possibility of disengagement occurring 
as part of a broader process of demobilization, such as following amnesties or demobilization 
programs or within the framework of peace-building and rehabilitation processes. Also, it leaves 
the question of psychological de-radicalization open (Doosje et al. 2016). In fact, individuals 
might disengage without ever de-radicalizing (Altier et al. 2014, 648). 
2  The terms Islamists and jihadists are used interchangeably.  
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First Chechnya War (1994-1996) and the Second Chechnya War (1999-). More 
specifically, we aim to examine differences in disengagement pathways between 
nationalist and Islamist groups.  
It has been argued in the literature that while nationalists seek self-determination 
and tend to use ideology instrumentally for the achievement of this goal, Islamists have 
higher levels of commitment to the absolute values of their organization and their 
behaviour is thus not reducible to instrumental reasoning (Gutiérrez and Wood 2014; 
Hegghammer 2009; Piazza 2009).3 Scholars proposed that difference in the type of 
ideology and a higher degree of exposure to ideological indoctrination among Islamists is 
key for the process of individual disengagement. It affects the militants’ capacity to resist 
external pressure, their patterns of use of violence, and their social bonds with local 
communities and group cohesiveness. A comparative focus on Chechen nationalists and 
Islamists enables researchers to identify how substantive differences in the ideologies of  
militant organizations affect group-level disengagement, an aspect that has not been 
sufficiently recognized in existing research. Since the end of the First Chechen War in 
1996, Chechnya’s once-dominant nationalist forces began to morph into an Islamist 
movement, which eventually replaced in 2007 the initially nationalist-inspired Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria with the Salafi-inspired Caucasus Emirate (Hughes 2007; Russell 
2009). This transformation has been accompanied by large-scale, albeit generally 
individualized, disengagement and ‘re-qualification’ of former nationalist fighters. While 
                                                 
3  This is particularly relevant for absolutist or universal Islamist groups, described 
by Piazza (2009), who pursue global jihad, as opposed to strategic or instrumental 




some former nationalists abandoned armed struggle altogether, many others decided to join 
jihadist groups. Only a segment of nationalists remained in insurgent groups in which 
nationalist motivation has persisted, albeit masked by these groups’ increasingly visible 
jihadist symbolic and rhetoric (Souleimanov 2014b).  
Despite the existence of a rich body of literature on the Islamization of the Chechen 
insurgency (Hahn 2008; Souleimanov 2011; Sagramoso 2012), micro-level empirical 
analyses of how and why individual militants disengaged are notoriously rare 
(Souleimanov and Aliyev 2014).4 Drawing empirical insights from unique in-depth 
interviews with former members of Chechen militant groups, their relatives, eyewitnesses 
of the First and the Second Chechnya Wars, and experts, this study seeks to explore what 
effect does the ideology have on militants’ choices concerning disengagement over the 
course of the two subsequent Chechen wars.  
 
Causes of disengagement 
                                                 
4 Thematically and theoretically, this study builds up on research published in 
Souleimanov and Aliyev (2014) book. However, the current study substantially differs 
from the book (which investigates individual disengagement) because it focuses 
exclusively on the group-level disengagement. In contrast to Souleimanov and Aliyev 
(2014) book, which covers a broad group of militants divided into nationalists, avengers 
and Islamists, this article has particular focus on the armed group's ideology. We 
specifically examine two types of militant organisations: nationalist and Islamist. The 
article presents more empirically rich analysis supported by 19 extra interviews with 
experts. In addition, 22 additional interviews were carried out with eye-witnesses of the 
Chechen wars. All these new interviews provide more nuanced and contextualized 
insights into the issue of group-level disengagement. Lastly, the 2014 book focuses on 
both Chechnya and Dagestan, whereas this article covers only Chechnya. The empirical 
analysis conducted in the article compares the First and Second Chechen Wars, which is 
fundamentally different from the empirical analysis of the book, which was focused on 




In our analysis of militant disengagement, we focus on nationalist and Islamist 
militants. We define as nationalist militant groups non-state armed groups that pursue some 
form of self-determination such as the creation of a nation-state with clearly defined 
physical borders (Cunningham 2014), as for example the Basque ETA, the Indonesia’s 
Free Aceh Movement, and the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Alonso 
2011; Horgan 2009; Souleimanov 2006). We define Islamist militant groups as non-state 
armed groups that seek, at least rhetorically, the establishment of an Islamic theocracy 
expanding across the Muslim world and who reject the nation-state and civil law (see Toft 
and Zhukov 2015, 223), such as for example the Islamic State and the Al-Nusra Front in 
Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or the various Salafi-jihadist organizations fighting 
in Chechnya (Hegghammer 2009; Souleimanov 2011).5 In their daily practice, nationalists 
receive generally less exposure to ideological indoctrination than Islamists (Hegghammer 
2009). Indeed, while the degree of ideological exposure may vary across different 
nationalist groups and among individual militants belonging to those groups, it is generally 
perceived that militants belonging to these organizations have fairly weak ideological 
exposure (Piazza 2009). In contrast to nationalists, spiritual motives and the absolute 
importance of ideology are fundamental for Islamist militants (Piazza 2009). As 
documented in a number of studies (Hafez 2008; Alexander 2012; Hanasz 2012), jihadist 
militant groups, similarly to ethno-nationalist groups, generally attract large numbers of 
recruits, many (although not all) of whom initially lack detailed knowledge of religious 
                                                 
5  In some cases, nationalist and Islamist aspects may overlap in the same 
organization (for example the Palestinian Hamas). In other cases, there are alliances 
between nationalist and Islamist organizations (Christia 2012; Sinno 2009). The 




texts or even sufficient familiarity with the organization’s principal ideology. While the 
radical beliefs of some individuals may ‘harden’ as a result of their socialization within the 
Islamist organization and, especially, subject to state repression, the radicalization of views 
typically precedes joining the group (Doosje et al. 2016). After joining the organization, 
recruits motivated by jihadist ideology usually further undergo extensive and continuous 
indoctrination and exposure to the group’s ideology, more so than members of nationalist 
groups (Nesser 2006; Hegghammer 2009).  
Nationalists tend to invest in ideological training for instrumental purposes such as 
the achievement of self-determination, independence or autonomy from the state. Often 
they are capable of adapting their strategies under changing circumstances, for example, as 
a result of battle fatigue. For Islamists, religious dogmas, that form the base of their 
ideology, commit most of their members normatively and emotionally to certain patterns 
of behavior (Gutierrez and Wood 2014).6 The process which leads Islamist militants toward 
normative commitment is described in the literature as radicalization (Horgan 2009, 
Rabasa et al. 2010). Rabasa et al. (2010, 28) emphasize that “[a]lthough all kinds of 
militants may be fervent adherents to secular ideologies, religion provides a different type 
of motivation due to its promise that the devoted will receive an everlasting reward in the 
afterlife.” Due to the promises of afterlife and the concept of intrinsic righteousness 
engrained in religious ideologies of militant Islamist groups, their recruits are relatively 
easier to radicalize than members of ethno-nationalist or ‘secularly’ motivated groups 
(Piazza 2009). In contrast to nationalist militants, Islamist militants are more willing to 
                                                 
6 There are exceptions to this presentation, as for example certain nationalists have 
used religion-like dogmas to produce doctrines of self-sacrifice much like the Islamist 
groups of today (Bartov 1992; Hall and Malešević 2013). 
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sacrifice themselves and are willing to become martyrs (shahids) in the name of faith and 
divine purpose (Toft and Zhukov 2015). With the above in mind, we empirically examine 
how these two distinct types of Chechen militants pursued disengagement. We structure 
our empirical enquiry alongside four mechanisms of group-level disengagement: external 
pressure, use of violence, social bonds and group cohesiveness.  
 
Data and methods 
We examine the four aforementioned mechanisms on a case study of militants 
involved in the two subsequent armed conflicts in Chechnya. This context provides us with 
the simultaneous existence of nationalist and Islamist militants, which gives us the 
opportunity to compare across types of organizations that share similar background. As 
stated in the introduction, the Chechen conflict has become more and more “Islamized” 
over time, with Islamist organizations becoming more numerous over the years. External 
pressure on the government to encourage disengagement increased with the establishment 
of the kadyrovtsy counterinsurgent units which have systematically targeted militants’ 
family members especially in the early 2000s (Souleimanov 2015a; see also Toft and 
Zhukov 2015, 228). Hence, with regards to external pressure, Islamists should have been 
exposed to disengagement pressure at least as heavily as nationalists. For the second and 
third mechanisms, we believe that the effect of time is less decisive. 
This study draws primarily on interviews with three major categories of informants: 
(1) former insurgents; (2) their relatives, friends, neighbors and eyewitnesses; and (3) 
experts. Firstly, 28 unique in-depth semi-structured interviews with former Chechen 
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insurgents were conducted between 2007 and 2015.7 Of these interviewees, 23 were 
nationalists and five jihadists. The skewed sample is due to the fact that disengagement has 
been extremely rare among Chechen jihadists. In fact, there are no exact numbers of 
disengaged militants in Chechnya. According to Pavel Krasheninnikov, the former head of 
the legislative committee of the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, 
“... nobody [in federal authorities] checked the capitulation [of former 
insurgents]“ (Kavkaz Uzel 2006). In the absence of formal statistics about disengaged 
insurgents, available evidence from open sources and the informants consulted for this 
article coincide in that former insurgents who sought disengagement overwhelmingly 
belonged to the nationalist branch.8 
Also, while nationalists and their families have left Chechnya en masse for the sake 
of survival, seeking political asylum in Turkey and European countries, jihadists have 
sought martyrdom on the battlefield, with their families remaining in Chechnya. Therefore, 
access to former nationalists was relatively easy given the authors’ long-standing contacts 
with Chechen émigré communities in Europe and Turkey. By contrast, the task of 
identifying and locating former jihadists was much more difficult. Nevertheless, our pool 
of five former Chechen jihadists is unique in the literature to date. While these numbers do 
not constitute a representative sample, they nevertheless form one of the largest samples 
                                                 
7  We largely follow recommendations by Harris et al. (2016, 613) for the reporting 
of interview material. 
8  For instance, Russian media reported the capitulation of dozens of nationalist 
insurgents in the period between 2003 and 2006, including such well-known insurgent 
commanders as Sulim Yamadaev, Magomed Khambiyev, Ruslan Israpilov, Ali 
Suleymanov and Sulim Eldarov. Even when prominent nationalist commanders refused 
to capitulate or disengage, many of their foot soldiers did, as was the case of the groups 
led by the nationalists Ruslan Gelayev, Aslan Maskhadov, and others. See RBK (2004), 
Kavkaz Uzel (2008), News.ru (2006) and Regnum (2003).  
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available to date in the extant scholarship on the North Caucasus insurgency, and one of 
the few drawing on interview-based methods of inquiry. This is conditioned by the fact that 
conflict-related violence in the region—including in Chechnya—is ongoing, which 
considerably limits the accessibility of respondents. 
 Referral and snowballing techniques were used to gain access to informants from 
among former insurgents. The authors’ long-term contacts with some key former insurgent 
and separatist leaders, ordinary insurgents, and reputed members of Chechen diaspora 
communities based in Europe and Turkey facilitated access to the ex-insurgents and 
ensured mutual trust between the researchers and interviewees. Due to security concerns, 
interviews were conducted outside Chechnya and Russia in various European and Turkish 
cities. For this same reason, all of the former insurgents consented to the interviews on the 
condition of strict confidentiality. Therefore, their names – and the exact locations of the 
interviews – are not disclosed in this article. 
 Interviews with former insurgents lasted from around three to six hours, with the 
average interview lasting around three and a half hours. In some occasions, interviews with 
two or more insurgents were conducted. The semi-structured interviews revolved around 
the central themes of disengagement, with questions moving from general to more 
narrowly formulated ones. This enabled the interviewees to develop their narratives in the 
most unrestricted way, leaving room for their own stories to unfold. Whenever possible, 
direct questions were avoided.9 Since the focus of our research was exclusively on 
                                                 
9  Interviews with former insurgents included, inter alia, these major questions: ‘Why did you 
decide to leave your armed group?’, ‘Was your decision prompted by any event or process?’, ‘What forms 
did the pressure to stay in your armed group/to leave it take?”;What facilitated/complicated your return to 
peaceful life?”, “What were your major concerns while leaving your group?”, “During your time with your 
armed group, did you stay in touch with your community?” 
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disengagement, we did not carry out interviews on causes of violent mobilisation and their 
relationship with disengagement.  
The second batch of our interviewees (n=27) includes the relatives of former 
nationalists (9) and of jihadists (5), the close friends of former nationalists (3) and of 
jihadists (4), as well as the former neighbors of nationalists (3) and jihadists (3). This group 
of interviewees served as a valuable source of information regarding the life trajectories 
and the societal contexts of the insurgents' choices with regard to disengagement. These 
interviews lasten spanned from an hour to around four hours. In addition, discussions with 
eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars (n=22) were carried out to inquire about the general 
context of the political violence in the North Caucasus and its repercussions. The criterion 
for selecting interviewees of this second batch was their first-hand experience with the 
researched phenomenon.10  
A third group of interviewees (n=19) included leading Chechen and Russian 
journalists, political analysts, human rights activists, and scholars with first-hand 
experience with the researched phenomenon.11 These interviews spanned from an hour to 
                                                 
10  These interviews were centered around the following questions: “Did your community have any 
contact with nationalist/jihadist insurgents during the 2000s – and why?”, “What made insurgents 
hesitant/willing to return to their/your communities?”, “What categories of insurgents were more or less 
willing to disengage – and why?” During the interviews, our interlocutors were able to relatively easily 
identify nationalist and jihadist groups as they were knowledgeable of their dominant ideology, leadership, 
and goals. Although nationalist groups did extensively use Islamist symbols in an effort to legitimize their 
fight, our interlocutors were still able to tell apart the rhetoric and stylistic of insurgent groups from their 
ideology.  
11  Those who allowed to be named include: Lema Tsjabajev (Chabayev), former press secretary of 
president Aslan Maskhadov at the Main Headquarters of the Chechen Army, currently a Prague-based 
journalist with the North Caucasus Service of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Mairbek Vatchagaev, 
the former General Representative of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Moscow, currently a non-
resident fellow of the Jamestown Foundation; Mairbek Taramov, the Baku-based head of the Chechen 
Human Rights Centre; Usman Ferzauli, the Copenhagen-based ‘minister of foreign affairs of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria’; Abdulla Duduyev, the Moscow-based chief editor of the liberal Chechen journal 
‘Dosh’; Taus Serganova, a Grozny-based journalist with ‘Dosh’; Ruslan Tachayev, a former high-ranking 
officer of the Chechen Army and currently a Vienna-based dissident and human rights activist; Huseyn 
Iskhanov, a former high-ranking officer of the Operative Directorate of the Main Headquarters of the Army 
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around two hours. Direct questions were often asked during these interviews as to validate 
the accuracy of data provided by the first two groups of interviewees. In addition, seven 
interviews were conducted with predominantly Chechen human rights activists, experts, 
and former members of the Ichkerian elites, who explicitly requested anonymity in the 
article.  
Most cases referred to in all interviews date to the period 2000–2007, while some 
interviewees addressed events spanning 1994-1996. Whenever interviewees expressed 
specific concerns with being videotaped or recorded, notes were taken either during or 
immediately after the interviews, depending on the interviewee’s comfort level. 
Interviews were supplemented with extensive ethnographic fieldwork, conducted 
by authors among eyewitnesses of both Chechen wars in the Chechen émigré communities 
based in Turkey and European countries, and the consultation of online documents from 
open sources. While these additional observations allowed for extensive triangulation of 
the interview material, the interviews themselves conducted with respondents from three 
different backgrounds helped to overcome the shortcomings of a limited sample and to 
compensate for potential biases, especially with regard to jihadists. Most of our ethnic-
Chechen interviewees from ethno-nationalist groups self-identified as nationalists 
                                                 
of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, currently a Vienna-based activist and dissident; Andrei Babitsky, an 
award-winning journalist, formerly with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, who covered both Chechen 
wars on the ground; Varvara Pakhomenko, an analyst of the International Crisis Group’s Russian Justice 
Initiative who concentrates on Chechnya and the North Caucasus; Ivan Sukhov, a journalist with 
Kommerstant who covered the Second Chechen War on the ground; and Irina Gordienko, a journalist with 
Novaya gazeta specializing in the North Caucasus. We discussed various aspects of the violence in the 
North Caucasus, including the central themes of our article, with Tanya Lokshina of the Moscow branch of 
the Human Rights Watch and Svetlana Gannushkina of the Memorial human rights organization. In 
addition, in the period of 2007-2016, we carried out discussions with around two dozen predominantly 
Russian specialists who provided subject-matter expertise on the political violence in this North Caucasian 
republic. These specialists have included, among others, Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, the head of the Europe 
and Central Asia department of the International Crisis Group and a former officer of Memorial based in 




(“Ichkerians” in their vocabulary) as opposed to “radicals”, “extremists”, “fanatics”, 
“Salafis” or “Wahhabis.” They tended to downplay the salience of the nationalist-Islamist 
cleavage in the war-torn Chechen society in an attempt to portray the Chechens as a unique 
and indivisible people. Some sought to disqualify the emergence and functioning of jihadist 
groups as the “work of Arabs, Russian secret services, and other non-Chechens.”12  
Since desertion, capitulation, and defection are considered demeaning in the honor-
centered Chechen society with its strongly embedded codes of masculinity and warrior 
ethos, some Chechen respondents often hesitated to admit that their fellow Ichkerians were 
more susceptible to pressures to disengage than their Islamist counterparts. Even against 
the backdrop of such bias, our respondents self-identifying as nationalists provided in their 
testimonies sufficient evidence for our core claims. By and large, the interviews across the 
three discussed categories exhibited remarkable consistency. 
 
External pressure and capacity to resist 
Interviews demonstrate that individuals who joined armed units in the name of 
establishing an independent Chechen state were considerably more susceptible to external 
pressures to disengage than individuals who joined jamaats, i.e. jihadist groups. A common 
and recurring theme in the explanations provided by self-declared nationalist or patriot 
interviewees evolved around the notion of Islamists being ‘religious fanatics’ who, unlike 
nationalist fighters, rarely cared about their earthy concerns. According to one such 
interviewee, ‘Wahhabites only cared about jannat [heaven], and whether their relatives 
                                                 
12  Interviews with Taramov and Iskhanov.  
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could be killed by kadyrovtsy or not played little role in their considerations.’13 In fact, one 
of the most telling examples was the use of violence or threat thereof against insurgents' 
relatives, a practice frequently deployed by the Russian military's Chechen proxies—
known as kadyrovtsy—in the first half of the 2000s.  
A number of Chechen insurgents, particularly high-ranking insurgent leaders, saw 
their relatives being abducted en masse by incumbent forces in waves of ‘forced 
disappearances’ that were commonplace in Chechnya during the researched period 
(Human Rights Watch 2001; Gilligan 2010). These relatives were threatened with murder 
one by one unless insurgents capitulated (Souleimanov 2015a). Facing this immense 
pressure, many nationalist insurgents submitted to the authorities.  
Emblematic examples involved Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev, Deputy Prime Minister and 
National Security Minister serving in Chechnya's separatist government and Magomed 
Khambiyev, Chechnya's Minister of Defence and right-hand man of secularly minded 
President Aslan Maskhadov. Both nationalist leaders ultimately chose to abandon the 
struggle in order to save the lives of dozens of their captured relatives. Commenting on 
Khambiyev's capitulation, a contemporary report by Memorial—a prominent Russian 
human rights organization—asserted that:  
 
Given the situation that had developed surrounding him, his family and the 
dozens or even hundreds of both close and distant relatives, Khambiyev 
had no other choice […]. A different choice on his part would have been 
incomprehensible and unacceptable to the Chechen public – buying his 
                                                 
13  Interview with ‚Idris.‘ 
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own freedom with the freedom and lives of relatives would mean the 
breaking of unwritten laws and codes of conduct (Memorial 2004). 
 
As acknowledged by Memorial, social milieu was an important factor prompting 
Khambiyev's capitulation. A refusal to submit, resulting in the death of one's relatives, 
would be unacceptable in Chechen public opinion.  
While public opinion, entrenched in local customary law (adat), was salient for 
nationalist insurgents, jihadists openly decried it as they advocated for the complete 
eradication of what they considered to be non-Islamic heresy. Faced with the immense 
pressure of their captured relatives being threatened with murder, many jihadists chose to 
stand their ground and sacrifice their relatives' lives because, as one interviewee put it, ‘this 
would turn their relatives into shahids [martyrs].’14 Indeed, for many jihadists, sacrificing 
their relatives for a divine cause was thought to account for ishtishhad, i.e. martyrdom, as 
it would ensure eternal life for their unjustly murdered relatives. 
 Another reason for many nationalistic Chechen insurgents to seek individual 
disengagement was what appeared to be the impossibility of victory in armed conflict. In 
fact, as early as in the early 2000s, the backbone of the Chechen Army was broken by heavy 
fighting in the capital city Grozny and its surroundings.15 During the advance, the Russian 
Army pushed the remnants of separatist groups into isolated mountainous parts of southern 
Chechnya, thereby draining the insurgency of its local social base. At that time, nationalist 
insurgents increasingly realized that the war was irreversibly lost. To many of them, the 
                                                 
14  Interview with ‘Idris,’ a relative of an ex-insurgent. 
15  Within less than six months, the Chechen Army lost thousands of men and its elite forces 
were destroyed.  
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prospect of waging a war without the slightest chance of military victory or the opportunity 
to deliver a sizable blow to the Russian Army that would prompt its withdrawal from 
Chechnya was no longer appealing.  
Against the backdrop of mounting zachistki that swept Chechnya, and the 
humanitarian crisis that hit the local population, many nationalist insurgents were 
determined to return to their families to provide them with basic protection. As a relative 
of a former insurgent described: 
 
Many [Chechen insurgents] understood back in mid-2000, that the war was 
all but over. In that situation, there were two ways to go: either continue 
fighting and sacrifice your life and the lives of your kin sooner or later, or 
to seek some form of peaceful life. Many have opted for the latter, and 
given the overall context in the republic, we can't blame them [for that].16 
 
The superior motive of saving the shrinking Chechen population from annihilation—a 
prospect that allegedly loomed in the early 2000s as a possible consequence of the 
Chechens' continued resistance—and the ongoing use of indiscriminate violence by 
Russian forces were frequently referenced in the testimonies of former insurgents. 
According to interviewees, the one million-strong Chechen nation had no choice but to 
submit, however adverse and demeaning the repercussions, in order to survive in the face 
of Russia’s superior size and seemingly limitless military and economic resources.17 ‘The 
                                                 
16  Interview with ‘Aslan.’  




main task [of the Chechen people] at that [historical] moment was to survive [glavnaya 
zadacha – perezhit’].’18 Nationalist insurgents therefore viewed their abandonment of 
armed struggle as a lesser evil compared to the perils of continued resistance. However 
noble their steadfast resistance to the Russian occupation, ‘it would soon lead to their 
[Chechens'] annihilation from the surface of the earth’19, as stated by a former insurgent. 
The argument therefore posited that, ‘taking into consideration the realities of the day, it 
was absolutely indispensable for us to pull out of the war, get back to normal life [...] and 
give birth to children.’20 
The likelihood of military victory was, however, not the primary reason for jihadists 
to either continue or abandon the struggle. Interviewees were in agreement over the fact 
that jihadists were less driven to fight by the prospect of victory than by the process of 
armed struggle (jihad) itself.21 Former jihadists, while acknowledging the presence of a 
number of factors—such as revenge, patriotism, and personal frustration—motivating 
individual jihadists to fight, pointed to the notion of jihad as the primary and decisive force 
behind their armed struggle. According to one of them, ‘for such men... even if they failed 
to retaliate, achieve independence for Chechnya or create an Islamic state in Chechnya, if 
they lost their lives in the jihad, they would still consider themselves winners. That is what 
eventually mattered to them.’22 
                                                 
18  Interview with ‚Idris.‘ 
19  Interview with ‘Magomed.’ 
20  Interview with ‘Magomed.’ 
21 Interviews with former insurgents, both nationalists and jihadists, their close friends, and 
relatives. This idea relates to Wood’s „pleasure of agency“, which is not unique to Islamists 
(Wood 2003), and which goes beyond „instrumental reasoning“ (Gutierrez and Wood 2014, 220–
221). 
22 Interview with ‘Mairbek,’ a former jihadist.  
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In fact, participation in the armed conflict and the subsequent likelihood of self-
sacrifice along the divine path appears to have been of greater importance for jihadists than 
the declared goal of establishing an Islamic state in Chechnya, the North Caucasus, or 
globally. As a result, waging jihad—regardless of its ultimate outcome—therefore became 
a self-perpetuating and self-vindicating process. Unlike jihadists, for most nationalists, the 
establishment of an independent Chechnya was their ultimate goal as opposed to self-
sacrifice in the name of God or the nation.23  
In addition, while Chechen nationalists considered themselves as part of the Chechen 
nation and their armed fight as dedicated to and shaped by the interests of the Chechen 
nation, jihadists rather conceived of themselves as part of a global Muslim community of 
fellow believers, known as umma. The well-being and ultimate interests of umma were thus 
considered the jihadists' principal goal. At the same time, the particular interests of the 
Chechen nation were disavowed often along with the very notion of Chechenness as 
essentially non-Islamic and therefore heretical.  
Commenting on his experience with jihadists, a former insurgent summarized the 
attitudes towards the jihadists shared by many nationalist ex-insurgents and ordinary 
Chechens in that ‘jihadists cared little, if at all, about the Chechens. All that they cared 
about was jihad and jennet [paradise].’24 This view was largely supported across all 
categories of interviewees. As encapsulated by Andrei Babitsky, ‘for nationalists, the 
notions of native soil and shared blood – including family, clan, and people – were decisive. 
                                                 
23 Exceptions were nationalist insurgents who were driven by their desire for personal 
retaliation, as part of the local tradition of blood revenge. According to interviewees, such 
individuals were often willing to sacrifice their lives to avenge their relative's death, fatal injury, 
or humiliation. Importantly, avengers, as interviewees usually referred to them, were more likely 
to be recruited into jihadist than nationalist groups.  
24 Interview with ‘Ali,’ a former nationalist insurgent.  
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This is why they were relatively inclined to strike deals with the [pro-Moscow] authorities, 
and the locals’ attitude to them didn’t really change as they [nationalists] often did this to 
save their relatives from extermination. This wasn’t considered an act of treason. Whereas 
for Salafis, God was above all [...], survival was thought of in strictly spiritual terms – to 
get to heaven.’25 
Interviewees also suggest that nationalists were overall significantly more 
susceptible than jihadists to other types of pressure such as heavy casualties and significant 
wartime hardships, scarcity of food and medicine, and the incessant diseases that regularly 
plagued insurgents. Interviewees generally attributed these characteristics to jihadists' 
devotion to ideology, referred to by some as ‘fanaticism,’ and to the subsequent fatalism 
and self-restraint exhibited by religiously minded insurgents.26  
To summarize the ideas presented in this section, interviews revealed that jihadists 
were considerably more exposed to ideology than nationalists, and Salafi-jihadist ideology 
implied a normative and emotional commitment rather than an instrumental use of 
ideology, as more commonly practiced by nationalists. The level of ideological 
indoctrination among jihadists was so overwhelming as to render marginal the various 
pressures that typically pave the way for individual disengagement, such as physical 
survival, the unlikelihood of military victory, wartime hardships, and other related factors. 
Jihadists' willingness to accept self-sacrifice (ishtishhad) on the path of divine struggle 
(jihad) shaped by Salafi-jihadist dogma made these militants resistant to such pressures. 
 
                                                 
25  Interview with Andrei Babitsky, May 2016. 
26  Interviews with former nationalist and jihadist insurgents.  
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Use of violence and individual exposure 
From 1999 to 2007, Russian authorities declared seven successive amnesties to lay 
the legal foundations for fighters to return to peaceful civilian life (Souleimanov 2006). 
Amnesties were usually accompanied by the federal authorities’ practice of screening the 
identities of the insurgents who sought disengagement either collectively or individually. 
Those suspected of committing the felony of terrorism were rarely pardoned, if at all.27  
In Chechnya, jihadist groups were on average more likely to be responsible for 
committing highly lethal attacks, particularly against civilians, than their nationalist 
counterparts (McCartan, Masselli, Rey and Rusnak 2008). In fact, while terrorist attacks 
were nearly non-existent during the First Chechen War—when the local insurgency was 
led mainly by nationalist groups—the jihadist-dominated Chechen insurgency began to 
embrace increasingly lethal terrorist attacks beginning in the early 2000s (Toft and Zhukov 
2015, 228). Jihadists were therefore less inclined to disengage than nationalists because, as 
stated by a former insurgent, ‘to lay down arms [and return to peaceful life], you have to 
have some basic certainty that your life would be spared if, or rather when, they [the 
authorities] discover you.’28  
The increasing deployment of kadyrovtsy paramilitaries in counterinsurgency 
operations contributed to the strengthening of incumbent control over the populace and 
territory. Given their familiarity with the local social niveau, kadyrovtsy and their relatives 
were able to keep an eye on developments on the ground and to access quality intelligence 
                                                 
27  What usually awaited apprehended jihadists was life imprisonment accompanied by 
severe humiliation and torture or outright extrajudicial executions.  
28  Interview with ‘Umar,’ a former nationalist insurgent.  
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on the insurgents, their social connections, modus operandi, etc.29 As a result, authorities 
have grown increasingly aware of the insurgents' identities, and it is currently very rare for 
authorities not to know the identities of recruits for prolonged periods (Souleimanov 2015a; 
Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015). As a result, counterinsurgency forces exerted widespread 
violence against insurgents' relatives in order to force insurgents into capitulation or as a 
means of retribution. Those insurgents—both jihadist and nationalist—who initially sought 
to conceal their identities in an effort to salvage their relatives eventually lost the rationale 
to do so.  
The deployment of kin-on-kin violence perpetrated by kadyrovtsy had far-reaching 
effects. While on the one hand an additional impetus for nationalist insurgents to seek 
disengagement, it provided, on the other hand, for a certain sort of ideological ‘casting’ of 
would-be recruits into the insurgent groups. In fact, from the early 2000s on, religiously 
minded individuals seeking membership in insurgent units decidedly outnumbered 
secularly motivated individuals. Interviewees have also pointed out, as a consequence of 
this development, nationalistically minded individuals, avoided entering insurgent units out 
of concern for the safety of their relatives.30 This in turn further reinforced the ‘jihadization’ 
of Chechen insurgent groups.   
Over time, and owing to an increased capacity of kadyrovtsy, the lethality rates in the 
ranks of Chechen insurgent units grew. While these units numbered hundreds in the first 
half of the 2000s, they plummeted in the second half of the 2000s and later on, numbering 
                                                 
29  Chechnya's demographics and geography also contributed to this. Chechnya is a republic 
of around 17,000 square kilometers, with episodic insurgent activity being confined to around one 
fourth of the republic's territory. 




less than a hundred nowadays, all of them hiding in the harsh conditions of mountainous 
Chechnya.31 In a similar vein, the insurgents' social base was shattered. Due to immense 
control and the risk of retribution at the hands of kadyrovtsy, many Chechens previously 
sympathetic to insurgents ultimately chose to deny support to them (Souleimanov and 
Aliyev 2015). As a result, as an interviewee put it, ‘[jihadist] fighters are in fact kamikaze 
[suicides] as they have no other future than to submit to either a bullet, hunger, injury or 
cold.’32  
Jihadists, however, have managed to turn their vulnerability into a virtue through 
their profound disdain for death, wartime hardship, and their courage and devotion to their 
cause. Given their apparent reconciliation with their fate, jihadists rarely sought to hide 
their identities. On the contrary, they rather made every possible effort to reveal their 
identities in order to ‘strike fear into the hearts of kadyrovtsy and show [notwithstanding 
anything] they were not intimidated and were determined to fight until the very end.’33 This 
was also pointed out by Lema Chabayev, jihadists usually did not conceal their identities 
because ‘unlike nationalists, jihadists never counted on the possibility to disengage [at 
some point of their lives] and they rarely cared about the repercussions of their attacks 
amidst the civilian population. On the one hand, they expected no mercy. In fact, they 
strongly believed they were going to find jannah [heaven] [which was their ultimate 
goal].’34 
In summary, in comparison to nationalists, jihadists tended to use more lethal 
indiscriminate violence, had a higher acceptance of self-sacrifice derived from ideological 
                                                 
31  Authors' discussions with Russian and Chechen specialists, 2015-2016. 
32  Interview with ‘Shamil,’ a former jihadist.  
33  Interview with a Chechen political scientist, June 2014.  
34         Interview with Lema Chabayev, January 2014.  
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indoctrination, and cared consequently less about concealing their identities. This, in turn, 
made disengagement a less viable course of action for jihadists, when compared to 
nationalists, due to their fear of being exposed to severe punishment at the hands of the 
incumbent. 
 
Social bonds and group cohesiveness 
Unlike nationalists, jihadists in Chechnya have been a relatively socially isolated 
group due to their severed ties to the world beyond their armed group and their strong group 
identity. Since Salafi-jihadist ideology began to spread in Chechnya in the 1990s, its local 
advocates identified themselves in stark opposition to the local tradition. The latter, 
embodied by the local customary law, adat, and Sufi Islam—an eclectic form of ‘people's 
Islam’ considered to be heresy by Salafis—has historically shaped Chechnya's social 
fabric.  
Mounting theological tensions between proponents of the two competing camps led 
to armed clashes between jihadist revolutionaries on the one hand and ‘traditionalists’ on 
the other hand, beginning in the 1990s and peaking during the interwar period 
(Souleimanov 2005). Vakhid Akaev, a prominent Chechen historian, recalls the ‘harsh 
arguments between children and parents’ in Chechnya during the 1990s, when Salafi-jihadi 
ideology asserted itself in the country and the gradual emersion of jamaats. During this 
period, ‘[Salafi] children provoked their [traditionalist] fathers into such conflicts’ because 




… do not revere sheikhs and ustazes [murshids], do not revere the elderly! 
A question immediately arises: why is it forbidden to revere the elderly? 
The answer is simple: because it is tantamount to creating an equal to 
Allah (Akaev 2006, 19). 
 
As a result, jihadists were viewed by the local population as ‘Arabized Chechens,’ 
‘sectarians’, and advocates of ‘Wahhabism’—an alien ideology to the Chechens and their 
age-old customs—and were in turn stripped of their ‘Chechenness’ and disowned by their 
families and communities. This ultimately led to their loss of a significant amount of 
popular support, which stood in contrast to nationalists who retained strong social contacts, 
including popular support and community networks. As a Chechen political scientist put 
it, ‘being wahhabi [vakhkhabit] goes against all what constitutes the essence of 
Chechenness: respect to father, elderly people, Chechen tradition and values […]. You 
can’t be a Chechen and a Wahhabi at the same time.’35 
              While jihadists identified the imposition of Islamic rule and the establishment of 
a Salafi theocracy as the main premise of their struggle, the nationalists' goal of establishing 
an independent Chechnya resonated deeply with the local population. Accordingly, would-
be recruits into jihadist groups—regardless of their motive for joining such groups or the 
degree to which they embraced a group’s ideology (Souleimanov 2015b)—were usually 
shunned by their families and home communities. With the noteworthy exception of Salafi-
minded Chechens who formed a minority in the local population, many ordinary Chechens 
considered their cause unjust.36 In line with this tense relationship, jihadists have relied on 
                                                 
35       Interview with a Chechen political scientist, June 2014.  
36 Interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War.  
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funding from foreign donors, in contrast to the nationalist groups (see also Toft and Zhukov 
2015). 
Having severed ties with their families and communities, jihadists found themselves 
in jamaats that increasingly resembled religious cults, with members of such groups 
considering each other as family, with the group as the only social group available to them. 
In addition, as Salafi-jihadi dogma required individuals to disown anyone, even family 
members, considered to be hypocrite and apostate, jihadists had an additional ideological 
reason to legitimize their estrangement from their kin and local communities. Jihadists also 
had to strip themselves of any non-Islamic form of self-identification, such as race, class, 
ethnicity, kinship, and community, since the Salafi-jihadi dogma recognizes religion as the 
single legitimate source of identity. According to a Chechen political scientist, having 
embraced Salafi-jihadism, ‘they [fighters] ceased to be Chechens.’37 Many neighbors of 
families whose members joined a jihadi group in the interwar period and during the 
subsequent years admitted that while families initially sought to keep contact to youngsters 
as they saw their obsession to be temporary, the latter soon distanced themselves from their 
relatives as they saw their ‘Russified’ way of life, along with the elements of ‘pagan’ Sufi 
tradition, to violate the foundations of ‘true’ Islam. Often failing to convert their 
conservative relatives to ‘true’ Islam, jihadist expressed explicit disrespect to the local 
tradition which in many cases led their families to disown them, a painful act given the 
strength of patriarchal values in Chechen society. Having broken up once, it was extremely 
difficult for jihadist to be accepted back into their families and clans, with interpersonal 
and cultural distance between jihadist and their families strengthening over years.  
                                                 
37  Interview with a Chechen political scientist, June 2014. 
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As acknowledged by a former jihadist, after spending years in a jihadist group with 
all links to the outside world severed, the jamaat brotherhood becomes an important—
often the only—part of a jihadist's identity. His fellow jihadists become the insurgent’s 
only social contacts and jihad the only meaning in his life.38 ‘Salafi brotherhoods replaced 
families [for the members of jihadist groups], they were the backbone of the universe to 
them as they severed ties to their families and communities whom they [jihadists] 
considered infidel.’39 Against this backdrop, leaving a jamaat would pose an immense 
challenge to the very core of one's identity, unlike the prospect of leaving a nationalist 
group, where insurgents retained deep connections to their families, home communities, 
and other social networks.40 In fact, nationalists' membership in their groups was usually 
loose, unlike the jihadists'. Nationalists went in and out, rotating months ‘in combat’ with 
months in their native villages.  
In summary, the level of social bonding to the outside world and the strength of group 
identity are key determinants for disengagement processes in Chechnya. As suggested by 
interviewees, even those jihadists inclined to weigh the costs of prospective disengagement 
had nowhere to return to as they had been disowned by their families and were considered 
outcasts by local communities.41 Psychologically speaking, severing ties with a jihadist 
group required immense courage and motivation, which many individuals lacked. Unlike 
nationalists, who often retained various layers of identity, including ethnic, religious, clan, 
                                                 
38  Interview with ‘Usman.’ 
39  Interview with Babitsky.  
40  Over time, this isolation from the outside world encouraged jihadists to be less 
discriminatory in their selection of targets and lethal use of violence, as described in the previous 
section. They did not have to take into consideration the concerns of the local population that 
largely disapproved of these tactics. Jihadists' inclination to use such force therefore antagonized 
the local population even further. 
41  Interviews with former jihadists and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War. 
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territorial, and class-based forms of identity, jihadists' identity was constructed around their 
ideology and based more clearly on their membership in a jamaat. As a result, contrary to 




This article set up to provide an empirical account of how militants belonging to 
two key categories of organizations—nationalist and Islamist —disengage from armed 
struggle. We examined whether group-level militant disengagement would be driven by 
four distinct mechanisms: the capacity to resist to external pressure, the methods of using 
violence, social bonds, and group cohesiveness.  
Empirical examination of qualitative data related to group-level disengagement in 
Russia’s Chechen Republic demonstrates that rather precarious levels of ideological 
commitment among nationalist militants markedly distinguishes them from jihadists, who 
consistently show particularly high levels of ideological adherence. The differential 
ideological setup of the two groups has consequences for the process of disengagement: 
First, Chechen Salafi-jihadists, as compared to nationalists, show relatively low 
susceptibility to pressures such as paramilitary violence against their relatives, a bleak 
military outlook and wartime hardship. Second, in contrast to jihadists, who often resorted 
to indiscriminate forms of violence, nationalists were less likely to target civilians and 
members of their fellow ethnic group, and preferred anonymity in order to protect their 
families, which made disengagement a more viable option for them. And third, preserving 
close social bonds with family, friends, and the local population allowed nationalist 
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militants to find a way back to civilian life, as opposed to Chechen jihadists, who 
purposefully severed links with their kin and constructed their identity around close-knit 
brotherhoods of like-minded people. As a result, nationalist militants have been the largest 
group of Chechen militants to have voluntarily disengaged from armed struggle since the 
start of the conflict in Chechnya in the 1990s. Salafi-jihadist militants stand in stark contrast 
to nationalists. Only a small number of them participated in individual (or collective) 
disengagement during the observed period.  
Although these empirical findings are case-specific to Chechnya, they demonstrate 
that the pathways to disengagement are greatly influenced by the ideological profiles of 
militant organizations. Specifically, we show that ideology has wide-ranging effects on 
individuals’ wartime behavior. After a long-standing debate about the role of ideology for 
the functioning of militant groups and the motivation of individual combatants in the peace 
and conflict literature (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Gutierrez and Wood 2014; Ugarriza and 
Craig 2013), our analysis emphasizes the importance of ideology also for disengagement 
processes. Whether armed groups use ideology for merely instrumental reasons or, more 
extensively, as part of their modus vivendi shapes the group-level disengagement for their 
members. 
Since this article both draws from and builds on the contextual richness of a single 
case study, it does not make explicit claims to generalization. We are thus modest in terms 
of this article’s findings as we are cognizant of the natural limitations of ethnographic 
research in general and the limited (but still significant given our interlocutors’ security 
concerns) pool of our interlocutors willing to share their experiences about this enormously 
sensitive subject matter. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
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to date to suggest a link between ideology (Islamism and jihadism) and disengagement. No 
such claim has been made in the extant literature, nether theoretically nor empirically.  
In fact, the similarity of modus operandi and modus vivendi of nationalist and Islamist 
groups across cases suggests that this study's findings may hold more universally. Also, the 
idea that disengagement processes are not only driven by individual-level determinants, 
but also depend on the type of group and the related use of ideology, may be applied more 
broadly. However, the scope of the presented argument is limited by the fact that militant 
organizations, including Islamist groups, are often the result of local alliances (Ahmad 
2015; Christia 2012; Sinno 2009), and their ideological core may thus be less clearly 
defined than in the Chechen case.  
Future research might look at other settings of co-existing Islamist and nationalist 
groups to test our empirical argument. Cases with large use of indiscriminate violence by 
nationalists or strong ties between Islamist groups and local populations may provide 
particularly promising testing grounds. More generally speaking, the evidence base for 
research on disengagement, and especially group-level disengagement from Islamist 
groups, needs to be improved. Data on demobilized fighters from different countries (for 
example European jihadists who return to their home country) should be integrated to allow 
for more systematic comparisons. In practice, understanding the role of militant 
organizations’ typology may be crucial not only for the effectiveness of micro-level 
individual disengagement programs, but also for broader DDR processes, de-radicalization 
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